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TAKEOVER DEFENSE WHEN FINANCIAL MARKETS ARE (ONLY)
RELATIVELY EFFICIENT
MICHAEL L. WACHTERt
INTRODUCTION
How does one value a corporation whose shares trade on a public
stock exchange? To most commentators the answer to this question is
straightforward: the share price measures the pro rata value of the
corporation. In Delaware corporate law, however, there is an enig-
matic concept of a firm's "intrinsic" or fundamental value that need
not be its market value.' The assertion that corporations have an in-
trinsic value that can differ from the stock price has far-reaching im-
plications. For example, in the case of a hostile tender offer, a board
wanting to remain independent and informed as to the intrinsic value
of the corporation could claim, sincerely or disingenuously, that a
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I In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), in one sense the first of the
modern takeover cases, the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly distinguished between
the intrinsic worth of a corporation and its market value as determined in a financial
market. Id. at 891. Van Gorkom, the CEO of Trans Union, offered to sell the com-
pany to Jay Pritzker, a leveraged buyout specialist, for fifty-five dollars per share based
on Van Gorkom's determination of the company's intrinsic value. Id. at 865-67. The
stock had been trading between the mid-20s and upper-30s. Id. at 866 n.5. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court concluded that the board of directors was inadequately informed
when they approved the agreement and that, having decided to sell the company, they
should not have given away their right to solicit alternative bids. Id. at 883-84. In this
respect, Smith v. Van Gorkom foreshadowed Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1996), where the Delaware Supreme Court held that once a
company is put up for sale in an all-cash deal, management has the duty to sell to the
highest bidder. Id. at 184 n.16.
(787)
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hostile bid was inadequate even when it offered a substantial premium
over the prebid market price.
The ability of directors and managers to adopt defensive measures
to fend off an unwanted hostile tender offer is reviewed under the
Unocal standard. As the standard has evolved in Unitrin, directors and
managers of a Delaware corporation have been given considerable
latitude to adopt and maintain defensive measures, such as poison
pills, if, for example, the board believes that the hostile bid is inade-
quate because it is below the intrinsic value of the corporation's as-
sets." The latitude given to target boards of directors, however, is still
very much an open question. Defensive measures must be propor-
tional to the threat and cannot be preclusive or coercive,5 but there
are too few cases to predict how different fact patterns might be de-
cided. Just as undecided is the rationale behind a permissive standard
of review of a target management's defensive measures.
Over the past decade, a battle has been waged in the academic
and general legal literatures to either justify or vilify the settled fea-
tures of the Delaware Supreme Court's takeover jurisprudence.' The
starting point for the debate involves the appropriate allocation of
2 In this Article I do not distinguish between the role of the corporation's manag-
ers and directors. Although the differences are important, the issue does not have ma-
terial implications for the Article.
3 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). This intermediate
standard, at its most basic, holds that "[i]f a defensive measure is to come within the
ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed." Id. at 955.
4 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995). Unitrin added to
the Unocal "proportionality" standard, holding that "defensive measures which are ei-
ther preclusive or coercive" will be deemed "draconian," and thus will not be protected
by the presumption of the business judgment rule. Id. at 1387-88. It went on to hold
that if a defensive measure is deemed to not be draconian, "the Unocal proportionality
test requires the focus of enhanced judicial scrutiny to shift to the 'range of reason-
ableness."' Id.
5 Supra note 4.
6 The debate is summarized in the exchange of articles between Ronald J. Gilson
and Martin Lipton and Paul K. Rowe. See generally RONALDJ. GILSON, UNOCAL FIFTEEN
YEARS LATER (AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT) (Columbia Law Sch., The Ctr. for
Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 177, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/00713300.pcPabstractid=235417; MARTIN
LIPTON & PAUL K. ROWE, PILLS, POLLS AND PROFESSORS: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR
GILSON (NYU Ctr. for Law and Bus. Research, Working Paper No. CLB-01-006, 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taabstractod=268520.
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power between managers and shareholders. Although the managers
have authority to direct the business and affairs of the corporation
under Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(a),8 the share-
holders have the right to sell their stock.9 Why, or under what circum-
stances, should the managers' authority under section 141 (a) reduce
the stockholders' rights to freely alienate their shares to a willing
buyer? Absent a clearly dominating statutory or caselaw interpretation
to resolve the question, the focus of the debate ultimately rests on un-
derlying fundamentals, particularly the extent to which financial capi-
tal markets are efficient.'0
For purposes of this Article I differentiate between two contend-
ing positions." One position, which I shall refer to as the "manage-
ment discretion" position, has its strongest support among managers
and takeover defense lawyers. They advocate that board decisions re-
garding tender offers should be treated the same as decisions regard-
ing other corporate asset transactions, with the presumption of the
business judgment rule 2 being applied, subject to the normal govern-
ance mechanism of the corporation, namely, shareholder election of
7 See GILSON, supra note 6, at 6 ("As a matter of corporate law, existing doctrine
left wide open the critical functional question: who should make the decision con-
cerning the outcome of a hostile takeover bid?").
Delaware General Corporation Law is title 8 of the Delaware Code. Section
141 (a) states, "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2002).
9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159 (2002) ("The shares of stock in every corpora-
tion shall be deemed personal property and transferable as provided in [title 6, subti-
tle I, article 8 of the Delaware Code].").
10 Most of those who have contributed to the debate on this issue have borrowed
freely from finance theory involving the workings of capital markets, particularly the
efficient capital market hypothesis. The importance of assumptions regarding finan-
cial market efficiency is stressed in Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in
Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 973, 1010-13 (2002); Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L.
REv. 521, 528-33 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, just Say Never?'Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills,
and Shareholder Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 519
(1997).
1 For a clear statement of the two positions, see GILSON, supra note 6, which sup-
ports the efficient market theory, and LIPTON & ROwE, supra note 6, which criticizes
Gilson's position. A middle position is taken by Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock in
How I Learned to Stop Wonrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 871, 930-32 (2002).
12 The business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business deci-
sion, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in
the honest belief that the action was in the best interests of the company. Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984).
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directors. '3 The most prominent spokesman for this group has been
Martin Lipton. A central tenet of Lipton's position is that financial
markets are inefficient, so there is no reason to assume that share-
holders will be either adequately informed or compensated in a hos-
tile tender offer setting.
14
The current version of the management-discretion position, how-
ever, is highly incomplete and cannot withstand detailed analysis. In
particular, the management-discretion model has no solution for the
agency problems that arise in the hostile takeover setting. In such a
situation, management and directors are conflicted and the entirely
discretionary standard allows management to act in an interested fash-
ion without ajudicial check. This issue needs to be resolved in a fully
developed management-discretion model.
On the other side of the debate are the great majority of academic
lawyers. Viewing tender offers as a governance mechanism in their
own right, they argue that such control battles should be decided in
the financial markets.15 To most members of this group the idea that
intrinsic value is a separable measure of value that can differ from the
corporation's market value is inexplicable and simply wrong-headed."'
Although private information held by managers and directors may
cause a temporary gap between fundamental value and market value,
allowing managers a brief period to either inform the market or seek
an alternative transaction is sufficient to bring the market back to per-
fect efficiency. In this case, if a hostile bidder arrives with a cash offer
above the market price, the directors cannot meritoriously claim that• 17
the offer is below the intrinsic value of the corporation.
Elements of a shareholder-choice regime can be found in Dela-
ware Chancery Court decisions in the late 1980s, following the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's decisions in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &Forbes
13 LIPTON & ROWE, supra note 6.
14 Id. at 28-29.
15 GILSON, supra note 6, at 6-7.
16 This idea is the one expressed in LIPTON & ROWE, suprra note 6.
17 GILSON, supra note 6, at 9. Gilson states:
In the face of a non-coercive hostile offer, directors could respond to a belief
that the price was too low-"substantive coercion" ... by using a pill to secure
the time to negotiate or seek a better offer. In the end, however, after time
for negotiating and investigating alternatives, the directors could not 'just say
no" by declining to pull the pill, and thereby blocking the shareholders from
rejecting the board's strategy and accepting the hostile offer.
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Holdings, Inc.' and Moran v. Household International, Inc.,"' with City
Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco2° being a primary example.
Under Interco, a target management could use its poison pill to hold
off the immediate clutches of an unwanted suitor and search for an
alternative transaction. But the firm, faced with a noncoercive tender
offer, would eventually have to dismantle its defenses, giving share-
holders the final say as to the ultimate victor in the control contest.21
This doctrine was overturned in Paramount v. Time more than a dec-
ade ago when the Delaware Supreme Court first leaned heavily toward
22
a management-discretion position.
The reliance that both sides place on the workings of financial
markets, although central to their positions, is left either implicit or is
only inadequately developed. The same is true of Delaware caselaw,
with its reliance on a concept of intrinsic value that can differ from
market value. In criticizing Delaware caselaw, Ronald Gilson color-
fully notes that a "statute, like a golem, requires an animating princi-
ple to come alive," and asks whether there is an "animating justifica-
tion" for the current state of Delaware takeover defense
23jurisprudence.
18 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). This case held that Revlon's defensive measures were
inconsistent with the directors' duties to the shareholders. Id. at 176.
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Here, the court affirmed the directors' adoption of
a Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan as a legitimate exercise of business judgment.
Id. at 1357.
20 551 A.2d 787, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that "the board's determination
to leave the stock rights in effect is a defensive step that.., cannot be justified as rea-
sonable in relationship to a threat to the corporation or its shareholders posed by the
offer").
21 The Interco doctrine was developed by Chancellor Allen and was applied by the
Chancery Court in a number of decisions. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art ofJudging:
William 7. Allen, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 914, 918 (1997) (explaining that "[i]n Interco,
Chancellor Allen laid out.., an allocation of decision-making authority among share-
holders and directors when confronted with a hostile takeover," where "[d]irectors
were allowed to keep a poison pill in place while alternatives were investigated, but...
shareholders had the final say over whether to accept the offer").
22 The Delaware Supreme Court stated that Interco
represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of review under
Unocal principally because it would involve the court in substituting its judg-
ment as to what is a 'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors.
To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so in certain of its
opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper
Unocal analysis.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
23 More fully, Gilson states "[t]he statute, like a golem, requires an animating
principle to come alive .... But Unitrin's effective abandonment of Unocals regulatory
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In this Article, I take on the task of exploring the lessons of corpo-
rate finance as they relate to the question of contested control trans-
actions. Does finance theory provide some foundations for an animat-
ing justification for Delaware takeover defense jurisprudence? I
answer this question in the affirmative with the starting point that in-
trinsic or fundamental value is indeed a viable concept that is separa-
ble from market value. I then develop the implications of -two alterna-
tive views of financial market efficiency.
If financial markets are entirely efficient-the prevailing assump-
tion in the shareholder-choice literature-then the shareholder-
choice theory of takeover jurisprudence is clearly the winning' argu-
ment. If financial markets are efficient, then any hostile bid above
market value moves assets to more valued uses, enriches shareholders,
and, perhaps most important, disciplines managers to manage the
corporation on behalf of shareholders.
The same is not true if financial markets are only relatively effi-
cient.21 I use the term relatively efficient to signify the prevailing view
in the financial market literature that market efficiency, like perfect
competition, is an ideal that is unattainable as long as there are mar-
ket frictions. Specifically, when financial markets are relatively effi-
cient, while investors cannot expect to outperform the -market on an
ongoing basis, individual stock prices can still be incorrect at any
point in time-either under- or overestimating the value of the corpo-
ration.25
The failure of financial markets to correctly price the pro rata
value of the corporation is shown primarily by the inability of existing
models2  to generate a reliable estimate of the appropriate discount
rate or market capitalization rate for equity capital on a continuing
basis. This rate is a critical building block in determining the com-
pany's cost of capital, which in turn drives the firm's capital expendi-
function brings us back to the need for an animating justification: why should the
court prefer elections to markets?" GILSON, supra note 6, at 19.
24 In their text on financial market econometrics,John Campbell, Andrew Lo, and
A. Craig MacKinlay say that
[t]he notion of relative efficiency ... may be a more useful concept than the
all-or-nothing view taken by much of the traditional market-efficiency litera-
ture .... For these reasons in this book, we do not take a stand on market ef-
ficiency itself, but focus instead on the statistical methods that can be used to
test the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and market equilibrium.
JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 24-25 (1997).
25 See id. (discussing reasons why stocks cannot "reach[] a perfect efficiency
benchmark").
26 For an example of one such model, see infia note 35 and accompanying text.
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ture investment decisions. It is also the rate investors use to discount
the future dividends that the corporation is likely to pay, hence de-
termining the stock market valuation of the company's shares. If the
market generates an incorrect or imprecise market capitalization rate,
the market's valuation of the company's common stock is likewise in-
correct or imprecise.
I next explore the requisite features of financial markets that can
lead to the conclusion that shareholders might be better served by a
legal regime of management discretion in determining the outcome
of hostile tender offers. First, any underpricing of a company's share
price by the financial market is temporary so that the stock price ulti-
mately returns to the correct level2 7 Second, due to the presence of
asymmetric information, management may be better informed than
the market as to the correct market capitalization rate. Third, man-
agement's superior information may be difficult to communicate to
financial markets in a manner that is verifiable by the market so as to
be incorporated into stock prices.
When financial markets are only relatively efficient, hostile tender
offers that are above market prices but below fundamental value can
succeed. Although the market for corporate control in the form of
competitive bidding for target firms may mitigate this underpricing, it
is unlikely to entirely eliminate it. Given these results, the signal con-
veyed by the market for corporate control is, at best, highly noisy and
unreliable and, at worst, can distort the decisions made by managers
prior to the emergence of a hostile bid.
The final critical step is to recognize that the failure to resolve
agency cost difficulties is not solely a weakness of the management-
discretion model. Instead, each legal regime creates its own agency
problems. A shareholder-choice standard can lead managers to re-
spond to a threat of takeovers, not by managing better, but by "man-
aging to the anomaly." That is, the managers adopt strategies that
make it less likely that the firm's stock will become underpriced,
thereby making the firm less attractive to a hostile bidder, even
though the effect is to reduce the ultimate value of the corporation.
There are a variety of ways in which this phenomenon might be mani-
fested.
27 I am therefore assuming that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), or one of
the alternative mean-variance theories, is, in fact, correct and hence, the fundamental
value of the corporation is determined by the true mean-variance formulation.
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The most straightforward example would be a company that de-
cided to sell a particular asset that it believed was the source of the
underpricing and where the sale price was below management's esti-
mate of the true value of the asset. Another example is where manag-
ers avoid investments in firm-specific, long-lived assets for which the
discount rate is dependent on firm product market data that is not
verifiable by financial markets. Although the investment would in-
crease the value of the corporation, it would make the firm more vul-
nerable to market mispricing and hostile tender offers. Finally, man-
agers might invest in assets that play to market fads, in the hope that
their stock would become overpriced. Adopting strategies that lead
the company stock to be overvalued is the ultimate takeover defense.
As an extra benefit, the inflated currency can turn the potential target
into a bidder.
Should companies take such actions? What does the faithful fidu-
ciary do? For those who believe that financial markets are always effi-
cient, management should manage to the stock market signals. Since
there are no anomalies, all signals are accurate. But if markets are
only relatively efficient and managers believe, based on their own in-
formation, that certain actions reduce the ultimate value of the corpo-
ration, then the manager, as faithful fiduciary, would not make those
investment decisions.
When financial markets are only relatively efficient, legal decision
makers face a tradeoff. Standards promoting shareholder choice
solve the agency costs of managers who might attempt to entrench
themselves once a hostile bid has been made. However, those stan-
dards create incentives for managers to adopt strategies that make
hostile bids less likely to occur, even if those strategies reduce the ul-
timate value of the corporation to the shareholders. Standards pro-
moting management discretion have the reverse set of incentives.
The current Delaware Supreme Court standard that allows for man-
agement discretion resolves the tradeoff by encouraging faithful man-
agers to maximize the value of the corporation, but at the cost of al-
lowing the faithless managers to entrench themselves by rejecting
hostile tender offers that are truly above the firm's fundamental value.
[Vol. 151: 787
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I. THE CONCEPT OF FUNDAMENTAL OR INTRINSIC VALUE
As a matter of definition, economists refer to an item's market
price as its value. 21 In a full-information equilibrium, the market price
is the price that equilibrates supply and demand, and it is the price at
which exchange takes place. Most economic modeling is within the
confines of equilibrium models, and in such a context "intrinsic value"
is the same as market value. Hence, if directors wanted to find out the
value of the corporation, they need only refer to the stock market
price. In this context, judicial instructions to boards of directors to be
informed as to the intrinsic value of the corporation seem quaint and
artificial. From the perspective of the firm, however, the concept of
fundamental value is well-defined and is measured by the discounted
free cash flow generated by the company's assets.
The term intrinsic value, although used frequently in Delaware
corporate law, is not singularly defined. A reasonable place to look
for guidance is the appraisal remedy, where shareholders in a com-
pany involved in a merger or consolidation for which the appraisal
remedy is available have a right to be paid the fair value for their
stock.29 The problem with seeking guidance from this arena is that for
years the methodology used for calculating the fair value of a Dela-
ware corporation was the anachronistic "Delaware block" method. °
The Delaware block method relied on a number of factors, including
the stock price and the corporation's book value, to place a fair value
on the corporation.3 ' A weighting of the various factors included in
28 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMIcS 421 (14th
ed. 1992) (describing market prices as a measuring rod for dollar values).
29 Access to appraisal is available in three circumstances: (1) mergers involving
close corporations, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2002); (2) in situations in
which the consideration to be paid to shareholders is something other than stock (e.g.,
cash), § 262(b)(2); and (3) short-form mergers (squeeze-out mergers subject to the
section 253 merger provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law), § 262(b) (3).
Section 262(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law sets forth procedures the
court shall follow after determining that shareholders are entitled to an appraisal.
30 Eg., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983); see alsoJohn C.
Coates IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict
Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1265 (1999) (describing this method).
31 SeeTri-Cont'l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (listing the factors that
make up a company's true or intrinsic value); see aLso In re Radiology Assocs., Inc.,
Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. Ch. 1991) ("The Delaware Block Method actually is a
combination of three generally accepted methods for valuation: the asset approach,
the market approach, and the earnings approach."), quoted in Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma
Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 555 (Del. 2000).
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the block method represented the court's valuation of the corpora-
tion, and the determined amount was awarded to shareholders who
had standing to seek the appraisal remedy. Since the block method
was divorced from modern financial valuation methods, the legitimacy
of the Delaware courts' pronouncements on valuation suffered ac-
cordingly.
The block method, however, was replaced during the 1980s by a
more flexible method for valuation that specifically called for the in-
clusion of prevailing methods in corporate finance for calculating fair
value.12 In determining the corporation's intrinsic value, the Chan-
cery Court was instructed to consider "techniques or methods which
are generally considered acceptable in the financial community."
The court has now thrown in its lot with the modern teachings of cor-
porate finance.
The concept of the fundamental value of a firm is core in corpo-
rate finance. The firm is a collection of projects, each with its tangible
and intangible assets, and each project has a present value based on
the discounted stream of future free cash flow that it produces. The
method for calculating the discounted free cash flow generated by a
project is well established and there is less freedom to use arbitrary
devices in its calculations than is true in calculating accounting earn-
ings. The formula for determining discount cash flow can be written
as:
pV= FC(F)
(1+r)'
where FCFis the free cash flow in each year and r is the discount rate.
The free cash flow depends on factors such as product sales and prices
and costs over the life of the project. The discount rate measures the
company's cost of capital and is used to calculate the present value of
the future cash flow generated by the company's assets. The appro-
priate discount rate in all cases measures the systematic or market risk
of the investment and reflects the covariance of the investment's re-
32 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (critiquing the "Delaware block" method and
calling for the introduction of a more modern approach to valuation).
Id. These methods included "all factors and elements which reasonably might
enter into the fixing of value," including "market value, asset value, dividends, [and]
earning prospects." T i-Conti Corp., 74 A.2d at 72, quoted in Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
For an excellent article on the appraisal remedy, see Coates supra note 30.
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turns with the returns on economy-wide assets. 4 The resulting PV of
equation (1) is the fundamental value of the corporation.
Financial market outcomes affect the fundamental value of the
company through the discount rate. The most widely accepted theory
for determining the discount rate is the capital asset pricing model of
Sharpe-Lintner (CAPM). In this formulation, the company's discount
rate or market capitalization rate for equity capital is determined from
the following:
r = r +8 (rm - rf) (2)
where rf is the risk free rate of return in the economy, r, is the return
on the market, and 6(beta) measures the covariance of the company's
return with the market's return and is assumed to be a complete
measure of the risk of investing in the company.i' The term is the
company's market capitalization rate and, in the all-equity-financed
firm, is the discount rate used to discount future free cash flows to
their present value. 36 In a company with a single-asset, or in a com-
pany with several general rather than company-specific assets, the r
that is determined from equation (2) is indisputably the company's
appropriate discount rate.
In a company with many assets or projects, each asset has a differ-
ent discount rate attached to it. Asset-specific discount rates reflect
first and foremost real (rather than financial) market considerations,
including the cyclicality of the revenue generated by the asset and the
operating cost leverage reflecting the ratio of fixed to variable costs.
The discount rate appropriate for individual assets or projects can be
higher or lower than the company's cost of capital if the project is
more or less risky than the company's portfolio of projects. In equi-
librium, there is no difference between the covariance of real assets
with economy-wide assets and the covariance of the company's finan-
cial assets with economy-wide financial assets. Applying this analysis,
34 The only risk that affects the discount rate is the systematic risk of the project.
Idiosyncratic risk does not affect the discount rate because it can be pooled away by
investors. The term beta (3) is often used to connote the covariance of the project
return.
35 The initial presentations of CAPM can be found in John Lintner, The Valuation
of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47
REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19J. FINANCE 425 (1964).36 RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
195 (6th ed. 2000).
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the corporation's cost of capital is then calculated as a weighted sum
of the project-specific discount rates . In turn, the corporation's fun-
damental value is a sum of the free cash flows generated by the com-
pany's assets.
Disagreements between the corporation and the financial market
as to the value of the corporation can arise from two sources: dis-
agreements about the future cash flows and disagreements about the
discount rate. It is at least arguable that disagreements over cash flows
between the company and the financial markets can be minimized by
full disclosure of the company's private information to the financial
markets. Cash flows depend on factors such as sales, product prices,
and costs. These three variables are subject to some reasonable de-
gree of verification if disclosed by the company. The firm's sales pro-
jections can be tested against outside estimates of the size of the mar-
ket into which the firm sells its product. Product price projections
can be tested against existing product prices and market views as to
how product prices are likely to change. Finally, cost data can be simi-
larly verified by using publicly certified cost statements and projecting
these data forward based on reasonable estimates of changes in pro-
ductivity. Consequently, disagreements over cash flows between the
company and the market are less likely to persist in a situation where
the company provides proprietary information to outsiders who might
be willing to bid for the company.
What about differences with respect to the discount rate? The an-
swer to this question depends in part on the validity of CAPM, the
theory that generates the discount rate. If CAPM were robust in statis-
tical tests, there would be little or no room for disagreement as to the
company's market capitalization rate. The market capitalization rate
would be determined from equation (2), and the fundamental value
of the corporation by equation (1). On the other hand, if statistical
tests were to show that CAPM did not accurately predict future re-
turns, then one might conclude that the financial-market-determined
37 Given the difficulties of estimating beta, firms often calculate the rate of return
of the project, then determine whether this rate of return meets the firm's target rate
of return, which it views as appropriate for this type of project. For a discussion of this
issue, see RAVI JAGANNATHAN & IWAN MEIER, Do WE NEED CAPM FOR CAPITAL
BUDGETING? 6-8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8719, 2002), at
http://www.n ber.org/papers/w8719.pdf.
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discount rate, and hence the stock price, did not reflect the pro rata
381value of the corporation.
In the latter case, a company making a specific project investment
decision might well conclude that its own product market informa-
tion, based on the covariance of asset-generated revenue with econ-
omy-wide revenue, should be used in calculating the appropriate dis-
count rate for the project. If this were to occur, the company's
estimate of the discount rate might be more reliable than the market's
estimate.
The ability of a company to disclose its private information on its
market capitalization to financial markets is likely to be more difficult
than disclosure about cash flows. There are two reasons why this
would be the case. First, the company's disclosure of project betas is
information that the financial markets would find difficult to verify
depending, as it does, on company-generated estimates of the covari-
ance of the product market revenue and economy-wide returns. Sec-
ond, the financial markets have already generated their own estimate
of the market capitalization rate through their estimate of beta or the
covariance in the company's stock returns and the market returns.
The markets are likely to believe their own estimate of the volatility in
the company's discounted free cash flow.
Disagreements between corporations and financial markets with
respect to their estimates of the market capitalization rate are likely to
affect firms differentially. Market and firm estimates are likely to be
similar the more closely the assets of the corporation resemble assets
held elsewhere. For example, financial markets can easily determine
the appropriate discount rate for a real estate investment trust, be-
cause the underlying assets are bought and sold in real or tangible
markets as well as financial markets. With agreement on the price and
cash flows, one can obtain an estimate of the embedded discount rate
and use that information to narrow the range of estimates obtained
through the CAPM methodology. However, if company assets are
specific to the company, then this route for gaining information on
the discount rate is foreclosed. Consequently, imprecision in CAPM
will most affect firms with specific assets valuation. Additionally,
where assets are more long-lived, problems with CAPM are accentu-
38 See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Industry Costs of Equity, 43 J. FIN.
ECON. 153, 178 (1997) (concluding that there is uncertainty about the true asset pric-
ing model and that estimates of the cost of equity are "distressingly imprecise").
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ated. Because the discount rate compounds each year, imprecision
compounds over more periods in which the discounting is done:"
The upshot of this discussion is to answer the first question posed
by the Article: Is there a concept of intrinsic value of a corporation
that is separable from the market value? The answer is clearly "yes."
The capital expenditure decisions of the firm generate a collection of
assets that carry with them a set of asset betas or discount rates and
cash flows. Estimates of cash flows, but more likely of discount rates,
can differ between the corporation and financial markets. Differences
in estimates of cash flows or discount rates can generate different es-
timates of the value of the corporation. For example, a higher market
capitalization rate will lead to lower discounted future cash flows gen-
erated by the company's assets and, hence, the value of the corpora-
tion will be lower.
What should be made of the differences in estimates? For exam-
ple, should the company make investment decisions on the basis of its
own estimate of its market capitalization rate or should it adopt the
market's estimate? This is, after all, the critical question. At the core
of tlhe firm are the tangible and intangible assets over which the firm
has rights of residual control.4° The managers and directors, in decid-
ing on the assets in which to invest or sell, are determining the corpo-
ration's future value. As fiduciaries they have an obligation to act on
their beliefs and this may mean acting on estimates of discount rates
or cash flows that differ from market estimates. In doing so they are
maximizing the future value of the corporation. In short, ignoring
the information embedded in current stock prices may result in a
higher future stock price when the financial market is efficiently pric-
ing the corporation's assets.
39 Although specific assets are more likely to lead to disagreements between the
managers and the market over the value of the corporation, it certainly cannot be ar-
gued that disagreements over potential mispricing is the only factor that determines
the intensity with which firms adopt antitakeover defenses. For example, Robert
Daines and Michael Klausner argue that companies with high research and develop-
ment (R&D) are less likely to have staggered boards. Robert Daimes & Michael Klaus-
ner, Do 1PO Charters Maximize Firm Value?: Antitakeover Protection in 1POs, 17 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 83, 103 (2001). While R&D is only one aspect of specificity, it suggests that
companies adopt defenses for reasons unrelated to mispricing.
40 See Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theoy of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 1757, 1765-66 (1989) (discussing a property rights approach to the firm); Edward
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV 1619, 1634 (2001) (describing the intuition
that "nonhuman capital is the 'core' of the firm").
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II. MARKET EFFICIENCY: A BRIEF REVIEW
To talk coherently about capital market inefficiencies one needs
to have a model that specifies the attributes of an efficient market. A
useful definition is the following one offered by Burton G. Malkiel:
A capital market is said to be efficient if it fully and correctly reflects all
relevant information in determining security prices. Formally, the mar-
ket is said to be efficient with respect to some information set . . . if secu-
rity prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all par-
ticipants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set...
implies that it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the
basis of [that information set].'"
Economic profits are distinguished from accounting profits in that
economic profits measure excess or abnormal return. Earning eco-
nomic profits in security markets means that profits are above the
market rate of return. Consequently, an efficient capital market is
one where economic profits do not exist.
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) is typically de-
fined in terms of three alternative, progressively more inclusive infor-
mation sets that are available to investors.42 The first, or weak form,
defines market efficiency in terms of past market prices. The market
is efficient according to the weak form if investors cannot predict fu-
ture stock price movements based on an information set containing
all past price movements. The second, or semi-strong form, defines
market efficiency in terms of all publicly available information. The
market is efficient according to the semi-strong form if current market
prices contain not only all the information from past market prices,
but also all current publicly available information. The third, or
strong form, adds nonpublic information as part of the information
set. Markets are efficient according to the strong form if stock prices
include all nonpublic information as well as public information. Con-
sequently, if the strong form were to hold, an investor who was privy to
both private and nonprivate information could not consistently earn
abnormally large investment returns.
The next step is to define abnormal returns. What does it mean
to earn abnormal returns or, as more popularly described, to outper-
41 Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE MARKETS 739, 739 (Peter Newman et al. eds.,
1992), cited in CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 24, at 20.
42 See, e.g., Malkiel, supra note 41, at 739-41 (describing the three information
sets).
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form the market? Among financial assets, stocks have systematically
outperformed bonds, and bonds have systematically outperformed
cash assets. As a result, mutual funds that invest entirely in stocks have
systematically outperformed bond mutual funds. It is well under-
stood, however, that this outperformance does not reject the hypothe-
sis of market efficiency. Instead, abnormal returns are defined on a
risk-adjusted basis.
The ECMH itself, however, does not contain a measure of risk and
consequently must be conditioned on a theory that does conceptual-
ize and measure risk. CAPM is most frequently used for this pur-
43pose. The CAPM defines abnormal returns as a function of the sin-
gle risk factor, beta, which measures the stock's contribution to the
systematic risk in a portfolio. 4  But other models, typically extensions
of CAPM such as the three-factor CAPM,45 have also been used.
RonaldJ. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman wrote the classic article
of ECMH in legal scholarship.4 ' They noted that "[o]f all recent de-
velopments in financial economics, the [ECMH] has achieved the
widest acceptance by the legal culture[,] ... [and] is now the context
in which serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes
,41place." It is worth noting that the Gilson and Kraakman article ap-
peared in a symposium volume on the Securities and Exchange ActO,
and applied the ECMH theory explicitly to a range of issues in securi-
ties regulation. In fact, most of the legal scholarship involving the
ECMH has involved the application of the theory to securities regula-
tion.4 ) In this application, very little attention has been paid to the
CAPM component of the theory.
43 For examples where CAPM provides a theory of risk upon which ECMH relies,
see Lintner, supra note 35, at 19-22; Sharpe, supra note 35, at 436-42.
44 Sharpe, supra note 35, at 440.
45 Other examples of such multi-factor models include the Arbitrage Pricing The-
ory (APT) and the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). CAMPBELL ET
AL., supra note 24.
46 The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
47 Id. at 549-50.
48 Symposium, Contemporary Problems in Securities Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 545
(1984).
49 For examples of scholarship that develop the connection between ECMH and
securities regulations, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTrURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Robert M. Daines & Jon D. Han-
son, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J.
577 (1992); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 'Inaccurate' Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992).
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Ignoring CAPM in the context of securities regulation is under-
standable. The evidence from the finance literature is supportive, al-
though not uniformly, of the weak and semi-strong forms of the
ECMH as applied to stock markets, across a range of alternative theo-
ries used to describe risk. If stocks follow a random walk over time,
then all investors are on an equal footing. As such, time series tests of
the ECMH hypothesis provide a direct test of whether financial mar-
kets are level playing fields, the primary goal of the Securities Ex-
change Commission and its disclosure and enforcement apparatus. It
matters little that the evidence on CAPM is weak as long as the results
needed for securities regulation are robust across competing theories.
The strong form of ECMH, that the market prices incorporate
private as well as public information, has been rejected.50 Insiders, ei-
ther as individuals or as the corporate entity, can outperform the
market in a number of critical areas. That the company and its offi-
cers have an asymmetric informational advantage over the market is
hardly surprising. There is no requirement either under federal secu-
rities law or under state corporate law that the corporation needs to
disclose all relevant information. The corporation needs to maintain
informational privacy over a host of data that is relevant to its com-
petitive position. The SEC can hardly regulate away asymmetric in-
formation. What it does do, through its "disclose or abstain" policy,
5 1
is to prevent the use of private information, particularly on the part of
individual officers and certain informed outsiders. Consequently, re-
jection of the strong form of ECMH is not in itself a problem. A prob-
lem would occur only if asymmetric information resulted in a substan-
tial amount of trading by informed insiders.
Over the past decade, the debate over market efficiency has grown
more contested. Most researchers now agree that financial returns
are predictable to some degree, even after controlling for risk as de-
fined in the existing models. 2 Predictability represents an anomaly
since it is unexplained by ECMH. However, as will be discussed below,
the general consensus among researchers is that some degree of pre-
dictability is consistent with ECMH, as a reward for incurring informa-
50 STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 359 (6th ed. 2002).
51 This policy imposes no affirmative obligation on insiders to disclose nonpublic
information. Instead, it prevents those who do not disclose from trading on such in-
formation. For an example of this policy being applied, see SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1968).
5 Examples of such scholarship include CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 24; ANDREW
W. Lo & A. CRAIG MACKINLAY, A NON-RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1999);
ROBERTJ. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY (1989).
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tion costs and for assuming certain types of risk associated with the
trading necessary to keep markets efficient.55 3 In this respect, discovery
of anomalies has not changed the debate concerning ECMH and the
success of securities regulation.
Issues involving the governance of corporations, however, turn
less on ECMH and more on CAPM. It is CAPM that generates the dis-
count or market capitalization rate that is used to discount the future
free cash flow generated by the company's assets. Consequently, it is
CAPM that generates the prediction of the price at which the corpora-
tion's assets should trade in public financial markets. Markets can be
informationally efficient in the sense that informed traders cannot
outperform the market while individual securities are mispriced ac-
cording to CAPM. If CAPM inaccurately or imprecisely predicts indi-
vidual stock returns, then one is more likely to conclude that market
prices do not equal the discounted cash flow generated by the com-
pany's assets.
In fact, there is substantial statistical evidence that is inconsistent
with CAPM. CAPM does not robustly explain cross sectional returns
to groupings of companies. Due to data restrictions, the theory can-
not be tested on individual security prices. Exactly how the evidence
should be interpreted within the confines of financial models is
greatly debated.5 4 The CAPM currently in use is a single-factor model.
Other models that allow for more factors or for time-varying factors
have also been tested, but the evidence remains highly mixed.55 With
these doubts in mind, I return to the current debate in the corporate
law literature, wherein the problems with the underlying
CAPM/ECMH models have been insufficiently recognized.
III. ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS: SHAREHOLDER CHOICE VERSUS
MANAGEMENT DISCRETION
The two well-articulated positions over the appropriate legal stan-
dard for evaluating hostile tender offers are armed with strongly held
views on the efficiency of capital markets. The articulated parts of the
respective positions deal heavily with the appropriate allocation of
power between shareholders and managers, but very little with the
question of capital market efficiency. In this Part, I will deal only with
53 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 24, at 20-25.
54 This point is made by, among others, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay. Id.
55 Fama & French, supra note 38, at 154-58.
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the latter: the lessons to be learned from current perspectives on
capital market efficiency within the takeover debate.
A. The Argument for a Shareholder-Choice Takeover Standard
A legal standard giving shareholders more power to decide con-
tested control transactions has been widely favored in the academic
literature dealing with takeover defenses. Shareholders would get to
decide the outcome of contested control transactions involving a hos-
tile tender offer, and they would get to make their decision in the
capital market by tendering or not tendering their shares. Depending
on the particular version of the argument, management might have
the power, as it would under Interco, to postpone the decision while it
seeks to structure an alternative transaction. In the "director passivity"
model, the original pro-shareholder power argument, management
would not have even had that degree of discretion.
Easterbrook and Fischel first advanced the director passivity ar-
gument in their book The Economic Structure of Corporate Law.57 Al-
though their specific articulation of the theory is not popular today,
their argument explicitly developed the underlying financial market
claims that provided the basis not only for that model, but also for the
pro-shareholder models that followed.
The bedrock principle that motivates the director passivity argu-
ment is that stock market prices reflect the value of the assets de-
ployed by target directors: Markets are not only informationally effi-
cient, they are also fundamentally efficient. If this is correct, then any
bid at a premium to the market prices means that the bidder can de-
ploy those assets at greater value than the target managers can.' 9 All
else follows from this claim of market efficiency.
56 Scholarship that takes this position includes EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 49, at 79-80; GILSON, supra note 6, at 21-28; Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 798; Black
& Kraakman, supra note 10, at 978;John C. Coffee,Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institu-
tions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605, 605-06
(1997); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defen-
sive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUs. LAW. 247, 247 (1989);
Gordon, supra note 10, at 539-44. For a highly favorable discussion of Interco, the pri-
mary example of the shareholders-choice standard, see Vice Chancellor Strine's dis-
cussion in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
57 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49.
58 Id.
59 Easterbrook and Fischel argue:
Market price reflects the value of assets as deployed by the incumbent manag-
ers. That the bid occurs at a premium over the market.price indicates that re-
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The next step is to note that the successful bidder will scrutinize
target management and bid for the firm that is given a low valuation
by the market compared to the bidder's own estimate of the firm's as-
set value.'3 This can occur for two primary reasons: A bidder may
merge the target's assets with its own, thereby creating a more valu-
able entity. Alternatively, agency costs may lead target managers to ei-
ther underperform or divert corporate resources to their own use.
This is likely in a world with dispersed ownership that creates free-
rider problems that curtail the ability of rational small shareholders to
monitor management.
The final step is the big legal policy payoff. If agency costs are
large, then investors and society benefit from an open market for cor-
porate control because it will help discipline managers who might fa-
vor their own interests over those of the firm and the shareholders as
the residual claimants. Managers will be more reluctant to take purely
self-serving actions because doing so might cost them theirjobs. The
more unrestrained the market for corporate control, the more re-
strained managers would be in adopting self-interested policies.'
This point is critical and a great deal rests on it. Managers will re-
spond to whatever legal incentives are created in a manner that re-
duces the possibility of being taken over. If the rules "get it right,"
managers respond by being more efficient. But if the rules "get it
wrong," managers respond by becoming less efficient.
The director passivity theory fell out of prominence with empirical
evidence finding that the use of the poison pill led to transactions
62with higher returns to shareholders . If providing managers with a
window to find an alternative transaction was in fact paying off, the
academic theory responded by allowing additional time. The upshot
vamping the target's structure or management would generate private and, in
all likelihood, social gains. Successful resistance frustrates the achievement of
these gains. Consequently managers should remain passive and let investors
decide whether to tender.
Id. at 171.
60 Id. at 172-73.
61 According to Easterbrook and Fischel,
[i]nvestors benefit even if their corporation never becomes the subject of a
tender offer. The reality and prospect of monitoring by outsiders poses a
threat of takeover if performance lags. Managers must attempt to improve the
firm's performance, which leads to higher prices for shares and so reduces the
chance of takeover.
Id. at 173.
62 Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deter-
rence and Wealth Effect of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1995).
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was the coalescing of academic support behind the Delaware Chan-
cery Court's Interco doctrine.
Under Interco, target management could use its poison pill to hold
off the immediate clutches of an unwanted suitor. But the firm would
eventually have to be sold, including to the existing management
team, should they mount a management buyout (MBO), unless the
shareholders could be quickly convinced to value the current earnings
prospects of the firm more highly." Other aspects of the original pro-
shareholder position were retained. First, in the setting of contested
control transactions, management would have a conflicting interest-
namely fear of being ousted-and would respond by protecting their
own interests rather than those of shareholders. Second, since capital
markets are efficient, the share price of the firm either equals, or is
the best estimate of, the pro rata discounted free cash flow of the cor-
61
poration's assets.
A question posed by the use of ECMH is why, if a company's stock
were correctly valued, would a bidder want to pay an above-market
price? Take the case of the firm with inferior albeit faithful managers
who unfortunately made bad investment decisions resulting in a firm
with a collection of assets that cannot earn a competitive return. In
such a case, the firm has a low stock price correctly reflecting the
market's unfavorable assessment of the firm's future growth potential.
There is no reason for a bidder to emerge in such circumstances and
any bid above the market price is too high a bid. Saving the company
would be difficult because at its core are bad assets. Consequently, in
an efficient market, no bids above market value will emerge.
However, bidders can emerge in a perfectly efficient capital mar-
ket in a number of circumstances. The easiest case is the strategic
merger that realizes horizontal or vertical economies-of-scale or scope.
As in the above case, the target firm is correctly valued operating as an
independent company. In such a case, the bidder may know, based
on inside information, that a merger between it and the target would
increase the market value of the combined companies. Such strategic
mergers are indeed value enhancing, and because they create new
value, they pose no problem for the ECMH model. But this is not the
63 In Interco, Chancellor Allen gave shareholders the authority to make decisions
involving contests for control. See Gilson, supra note 21, at 918 (discussing Interco, and
noting its result that "[d]irectors were allowed to keep a poison pill in place while al-
ternatives were investigated but, in the end, shareholders had the final say over
whether to accept the offer").
64 This point is developed in Gordon, supra note 10, at 512-13.
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case around which the shareholder-choice camp has built its theory
because, until management attempts to defend itself, there are no in-
herent agency cost issues.
A second example does fit the agency cost case: the firm with
good assets and bad managers. Bad managers are more likely to in-
vest in bad assets than good ones. So this example requires a more
complex fact pattern to be true. The nagging question to be an-
swered is how the firm managed to put together a good'set of assets in
the first instance since this is no easy accomplishment. 'The generic
fact pattern will have a good manager turn bad. A number of stories
can be built around this line. One story has a well-managed company
for one generation of managers that is undermanaged in the next
generation. Another story has successful managers who build a well-
functioning asset base and then faithlessly divert the benefits to their
own use. In all stories, the plot has the same features: successful asset
accumulation followed by the underutilization of those assets.'
The capital market correctly understands that the assets in such
cases are good assets. But since the market believes that the firm will
continue to be undermanaged, the stock price is below what the value
of the assets in the hands of good managers would be. Now the bid-
der can arrive, ferret out the "hidden jewels," as they were referred to
during the 1980s, and make a bid. In a corporate law regime that is
supportive of hostile bids, undermanaged companies will trade at
higher prices than otherwise, reflecting the likelihood of the takeover.
But assuming that the probability of a merger is perceived to be less
than one, a bidder can emerge and pay a premium price.
Now add an Interco-type standard governing takeover defenses into
an efficient market and one has a greatly improved world. Efficient
capital markets guarantee that bids above market move assets to their
valued use; that shareholders aid more than the value of the assets;
and that only faithless managers will lose theirjobs, thus providing an
incentive to all other managers to manage faithfully. An Interco-style
rule allows these mergers to happen; provides protection against co-
65 Another variant is the case where bad assets become good assets because of for-
tuitous changes in the external environment.
66 One has to be careful in using capital market efficiency arguments to develop
theories about how corporate managers will respond to a set of incentives. The
CAPM/ECMH theory is a theory about investor behavior in the capital market. It does
not contain a theory of the firm. Take the statement: "Managers operating under an
Interco-style legal rule in an efficient capital market will respond by managing better."
This is a conjecture, and one might or might not be able to construct a theory of the
firm that reaches that conclusion.
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ercive bids; and, by providing managers with an opportunity to struc-
ture alternative transactions, encourages an auction process which
supports market efficiency.
Obviously, this does not solve all problems. Bad managers who
create a collection of bad assets are unaffected by corporate law incen-
tives. This is only partly a problem in the sense that corporate law
sanctions have always been understood to apply to faithless managers,
not to faithful ones who manage assets poorly. The paradigmatic
agency cost story is one where good assets exist and serve as the foun-
dation of extracompetitive returns that can be diverted by self-seeking
managers.
All of these positive features exist in the original director passivity
model as well as the Interco standard, but the refinement introduced
by the Interco standard is a very subtle one. In Interco, capital markets
are not all that efficient in pricing new information into stock prices.
Managers are assumed to need time to inform and educate share-
holders or to structure an alternative transaction. This raises difficult
questions. How much time is needed? Some market anomalies dis-
cussed in the next section show considerable persistence. In some
cases this continues even in the face of signals from management that
the stock is mispriced. Making investment decisions in real markets
takes time so that finding the best alternative transaction may also
take time.
The shareholder-choice camp has some good answers to these
problems. First, if nothing else, shareholders are paid a premium
above previously existing market prices. It is difficult to argue against
allowing the shareholders to take the money and run. As long as the
price paid is a premium over the prevailing market price, they can re-
invest the money in other securities.
Second, and perhaps most important, the shareholder-choice
model assumes that the market for corporate control is highly com-
petitive. Consequently, any inefficiency in the financial market would
be remedied if the legal rule required the manager facing a hostile
tender offer to seek competing bids, assuming they could not other-
wise convince shareholders not to tender their stock. But relying on
the market for corporate control to correct market inefficiencies
raises a new problem. In cases where the hostile bid rests on financial
market error in pricing the target's stock, a key positive feature of the
shareholder-choice model is weakened: not only do bad managers
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lose their job, good managers do as well. 67 The signal-manage so as
to maximize shareholder value or else-is weakened.
B. The Argument for Management Discretion to
Veto Hostile Tender Offers
The position that favors giving management broad discretion to
reject a hostile tender offer is most associated with the writing of Mar-
tin Lipton and his associates. His position, first stated in 1979, is that
"directors of a target company should be governed by the business
judgment rule and that in exercising their judgment they could take
into account the interests of employees, communities and other con-
,,68
stituents, as well as the long-term interests of the shareholders. Un-
derpinning this position is the view that capital markets are inefficient
and that the breed of hostile bids that emerged in the 1980s wreaked
havoc on managers, employees, and communities, and served to en-
rich a new class of Wall Street arbitrageurs. 69 Lipton also endorsed
section 6.02 of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance, which provides a standard that would allow managers to
favor other constituencies as long as they did not "significantly disfa-
vor the long-term interests of shareholders. " 'o
There are three primary problems with the current state of the
management-discretion position. First, it is incompletely specified so
it is difficult to analyze.7' Second, as a reflection of its incomplete
67 This component of the shareholder-choice model rests on the work of Sanford
Grossman and Oliver Hart. The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmet-
ic Information, 36J. FIN. 253 (1981). Grossman and Hart allow for bids that are below
the true value of the shares and recognize that some bids would not take place if the
market correctly valued the company's stock. Id.
68 LIPTON & ROWE, supra note 6, at 10 (summarizing Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids
in the Target's Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101,130 (1979)).
69 Id. at 11.
70AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, I PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02 (1994). Section 6.02 is entitled "Action of
Directors that has the Foreseeable Effect of Blocking Unsolicited Tender Offers." It
says: "The board may... have regard for interests or groups (other than shareholders)
with respect to which the corporation has a legitimate concern if to do so would not
significantly disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders." Id. The Delaware Su-
preme Court's expression, stated in Revlon, is quite different. See Revlon v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (upholding an injunction against
the board's actions because the directors allowed considerations other than the maxi-
mization of shareholder profit to affect theirjudgment to end an active auction for the
company).
As noted in the Introduction, supra, these problems also extend to the Delaware
Supreme Court's Unocal/ Unitrin standard.
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specification, different versions of the theory raise questions as to what
factors and constituencies, such as employees and local communities,
directors should consider in exercising their discretion in the setting
of control transactions. Some of these versions advocate stakeholder
rights that exceed those explicit or implicit in Delaware caselaw.
Third, in its current form, the management-discretion position does
not have an adequate answer to the agency problem issue that lies at
the heart of the shareholder-choice model.
I do not need to analyze these weaknesses in detail because this
Article's focus deals with a threshold question faced by management-
discretion models. Does any standard consistent with the basic tenets
of Delaware corporate law have a satisfactory response to the efficient
market argument? We know that if markets are efficient, then share-
holder choice is the winning standard. To what extent do claims of
market inefficiency dent the virtues of a shareholder-choice standard?
Perhaps surprisingly, the more inefficient the market, the less the
support for a management-discretion position. For example, suppose
the public capital market has no claims to efficiency in the sense that
there is no evidence that the share price reflects the underlying value
of the assets of the company. A bidder arrives with a tender offer to
buy the shares above market. The directors respond to the uninvited
tender offer by claiming that the bid price inadequately values the
corporation. But, ironically, the more inefficient the market in the
manner described, the less convincing is the directors' claim of price
inadequacy. If the share price has no tendency to move toward an ef-
ficient price, the gap between intrinsic value and market value is as
likely to widen as to decline. The directors cannot make a support-
able claim that by hanging onto their stocks the shareholders will at
some point in the near future be better off and will be paid the fun-
damental value of the underlying assets. Hence, absent claims that
the bidder's offer is coercive or misleading, the shareholders are
made better off by a legal standard that enables them to grab the
money and run.
Consequently, merely arguing that capital markets are inefficient
is not supportive of the management-discretion position over the
shareholder-choice position. For market inefficiency to be supportive
of a management-discretion theory, three conditions need to be met.
The first condition is that the market inefficiency is either transi-
tory or is subject to some type of mean reversion. If this is the case,
then informed traders can profitably buy stock in the corporation
whose assets are underpriced and eventually sell them when they re-
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turn to being correctly priced. Alternatively, informed traders turned
entrepreneurs could buy control of corporations that are underpriced
and then sell control at a time when the corporation is either correctly
priced or overpriced. Consequently if shareholders forgo a premium
bid that is below the fundamental value of the corporation they will
ultimately realize the fundamental value. That shareholders eventu-
ally get to sell their shares at or above full value is not in itself a win-
ning argument since by by-passing an earlier premium bid they forgo
earning the going rate of return in the interim.
The second condition is that managers have an asymmetric in-
formation advantage over individual investors in estimating the fun-
damental value of the corporation and that that information is not
easily incorporated into market prices by disclosure. The existence of
asymmetric information on the part of insiders is unassailable. Just as
important, however, is the second component of the statement. If
asymmetric information could be easily disclosed and incorporated
into market prices, the window provided by Interco for searching out
alternative transactions would allow for the information to be cor-
rectly assessed by investors. However, as is well known in the models
of asymmetric information, private information, although correct,
cannot always be verified by the uninformed party and hence remains
unincorporated in the investors' asking price.
The third condition is that the incentives created by a share-
holder-choice rule encourage managers not to manage better, but to
alter their business strategies in a manner that is detrimental to
maximizing the value of the corporation.
In the next Part, I investigate each of these three conditions.
IV. ANOMALIES OR PREDICTABILITY, MANAGEMENT INFORMATIONAL
ADVANTAGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW
A. Anomalies in the Fabric of Market Efficiency
The first of the three factors of importance determining whether
market inefficiency is supportive of a management-discretion theory,
and hence in the corporate law debate as a whole, is the role of
anomalies or predictability in the fabric of market efficiency. There is
growing consensus that there are anomalies represented by predict-
ability in future returns that are not predicted by the theory. Perhaps
the dominant position today, and the one taken in this Article, recog-
nizes that anomalies or departures from efficiency exist, can persist
for some time, and play a major role in the workings of financial mar-
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kets and the overall economy. John Campbell, Andrew Lo, and A.
Craig MacKinlay state that although predictability would have been
seen as an outright rejection of market efficiency in the past, it may be
a necessary component of market functioning since it rewards arbitra-
geurs for taking on dynamic risk." Indeed, "predictability is the oil
that lubricates the gears of capitalism," and departures from efficiency
"play a major role in determining the nature of competition and the
function of markets.' 3 If anomalies represent a regular feature of fi-
nancial markets, it makes more sense to talk about relative efficiency
where market efficiency serves the same function in financial markets
that perfect competition serves in product markets: it is the ideal or
benchmark against which departures are measured.4
The idea that financial markets are only relatively efficient is a
middle-of-the-road position in the finance debate. On one side is the
strict efficiency camp that argues that apparent departures from effi-
ciency reflect nothing more than data limitations or problems in the
precise specification of the theory. Markets get it right in pricing as-
sets, only finance economists get it wrong when they use inadequate
75data or theories. On the other side is the behaviorist camp that sees
anomalies as representing true departures from efficiency and argues
that the tests effectively refute ECMH/CAPM. It claims that once in-
vestor sentiment and behavior is incorporated into financial models,
systematic, persistent, and significant deviations from efficiency be-
76come the norm.
In the empirical finance literature, ECMH survives in much better
form than does CAPM. As noted above,77 the prevailing view is that
the anomalies that exist in the data are consistent with the view that
they represent a return to dynamic risk bearing. Consequently, the
weak and semi-strong theories of market efficiency still hold in that
72 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 24, at 80 ("A certain degree of predictability
may be necessary to reward investors for bearing certain dynamic risks.").
7a & MACKINLAY, supra note 52, at 4.
74 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 24, at 24 (arguing that whereas perfect effi-
ciency is an unrealistic benchmark, relative efficiency "may be a more useful concept
than the all-or-nothing view taken by much of the traditional market-efficiency litera-
ture").
75 In a recent article, Eugene Fama claims that the long-term anomalies are a
function of data sample and econometric technique and thus do not serve to reject the
hypothesis of market efficiency. Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns,
and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 303-04 (1998).
For an example of such a theory, see ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 112-53 (2000).
7 Supra text accompanying note 24.
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informed traders cannot systematically outperform the market by
making use of past price data or news announcements. In the strict
efficiency camp, most examples of anomalies reflect bad econometrics
rather than departures from ECMH. Even the behaviorists largely ac-
cept the conclusion that informed arbitrageurs cannot outperform
the market once risk is taken into account. The reason is that absent
a theory to predict investor sentiment, arbitrageurs not only take on
considerable risk in attempting to profit from irrational investor be-
havior, but also often do not succeed.8
The CAPM component of market efficiency, however, does poorly
in the account of any of the three camps. The central conclusion of
CAPM involves the predictions of the slope of the security market line
and the claim that the market capitalization rate of each company can
be explained by its stock beta. The results show that the security mar-
ket line has been consistently too flat for several decades, indicating
that certain classes of seemingly low-risk stocks have too high a return
and that beta is a highly imprecise predictor of the future excess re-
turns of individual stocks or portfolios of stocks. 79 Two major exam-
ples of these shortcomings are represented by the returns on small
company stocks and on stocks with high book-to-market value.""
How does the strict efficiency camp deal with this apparent incon-
sistency? The major work on the topic is by Eugene Fama and Ken-
neth French.8 1 They acknowledge the inconsistencies with the single
risk factor (beta) specification of CAPM, but argue that the solution is
to incorporate other risk factors into CAPM. In particular, they assert
that stocks of smaller firms, or of firms with high book-to-market ra-
tios, must earn higher returns because they are fundamentally riskier.
The high stock returns of small companies and companies with high
book-to-market ratios are actually capturing risk effects not otherwise
captured by beta.8 2 In the broader three-factor CAPM, they propose
that the security market line is no longer too flat: the anomalies have
been incorporated into the theory.8"
78 SILEIFER, supra note 76, at 13.
79 A textbook review of these points can be found in BREALEY & MYERS, supra note
36, at 199-205.
80 Id.
81 The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47J. FIN. 427 (1992).
82 Id. at 449-52.
83 The three-factor CAPM is still very much in the tradition of the original CAPM
in that the single tradeoff is between risk and return. The other mean-variance theory
is the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, first developed by Stephen A. Ross, and examined in
his article, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13J. ECON. THEORY 341 (1976).
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But the fix has its costs. First, while it is possible to advance co-
gent explanations that the two factors serve as proxies for systematic
risk, it cannot be proved. Yes, small size and high book-to-market ra-
tios are correlated with distress risk, but there has been no direct evi-
dence to support the assertion. This is measurement without a theo-
retical foundation. It leaves unanswered the question whether the two
portfolios are measuring fundamental risk or something else. Second,
even if one accepts the claim that the new factors capture risk, the al-
ternative specifications of CAPM yield imprecise estimates of the cost
of equity capital. Standard errors for the cost of equity capital of more
814than three percent are typical . Fama and French note that these un-
certainties result in estimates of the cost of equity that are "distress-
ingly imprecise. 85
The imprecision in estimates of the market capitalization rate are
magnified in valuing the corporation. The higher the growth rate in
the company's cash flow, the greater the sensitivity of the stock price
to even small changes in the discount rate. Even a one standard de-
viation range in the cost of equity capital could generate a range for
the correct stock price that could easily vary by 100% or more. In
other words, with respect to CAPM, reliable valuation estimates are
simply not available given the current state of the theory. If corporate
insiders believe that the market is incorrectly pricing their stock, they
might actually be right.
While the testing of CAPM is primarily in a cross section, there are
other anomalies that occur in the time-series context. Perhaps the
most significant of these is the time-series change in either divi-
dend/price ratios, or expected returns from holding stocks. In
CAPM, the risk premium on stocks, and hence the market capitaliza-
tion rate, should not vary over the business cycle. But, tests show that
the underlying risk premium does appear to be time variant rather
than stable as predicted by the theory.8s If the risk premium on stocks
varies cyclically, this will cause market capitalization rates for individ-
ual companies to increase during recessions and decrease during ex-
pansionsY.8  An alternative explanation, also consistent with the data,
84 Fama & French, supra note 38, at 178.
85 Id. The implication of the Fama and French article is that the mispricing can be
quite large.
86 This point is developed in John Y. Campbell & John H. Cochrane, By Force of
Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior, 107 J. POL.
ECON. 205 (1999).
87 Id. at 235-37.
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and also unanticipated by the theory, is that the source of the anomaly
is in changes in the expected growth rate of free cash flows rather
than in the discount rate.ss In other words, investors systematically
overestimate future growth rates during expansionary periods and
then underestimate future growth rates during contractionary peri-
ods. Here again, there is no consensus in the literature so that the re-
sults can be explained either as another anomaly, another source of
imprecision in the original theory, or another variant of investor be-
havior theory. 9
This time-series anomaly has importance for perhaps illuminating
some of the historical dynamics in Delaware corporate law. The boom
period of hostile tender offers which began in the late 1970s and con-
tinued at least until Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,go pro-
vided management with more discretion to counter them."' Of
course, hostile tender offers continue to this day, but their character-
istics have changed considerably since that time. The 1970s and 1980s
were years of abnormally low dividend/price or price/earnings multi-
ples. ' 2 This is consistent with abnormally high-risk premiums and thus
abnormally low stock prices, if abnormality is defined in terms of some
average of historical dividend/price ratios. Hence, it is entirely con-
sistent with Warren Buffett's comment at a 1985 symposium that, in
his view, most public companies traded at a price below what the
companies would be worth in a negotiated deal9
It would be nice to be able to quantify the nature of the anomalies
both as to the effect on stock prices and to the persistence of the mis-
pricing. Unfortunately, this is not possible because of the large num-
88 This can be seen from the constant growth formula
DIV
r-q
where P, is the current stock price, DIV, is the dividend expected at the end of the first
year, r is the discount rate referred to above, and q is the constant growth rate in divi-
dends. A percentage point increase in q thus has the same effect as a percentage point
decrease in r. BREALEY& MYERS, supra note 36, at 67.
89 For a discussion of this literature, see CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 24, at 181-
279.
go 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
91 Paramount provides a key example of this expansion in management discretion
as it essentially refuted the Interco doctrine. The Interco doctrine is discussed supra text
accompanying notes 20-22.
92 Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 13, 13 (John C. Cof-
fee,Jr. et al. eds., 1988) (comments of Warren E. Buffett).
93 Id.
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ber of disparate anomalies and the range of possible outcomes. Even
the two examples discussed above suggest that market anomalies
might be quite large and persistent in their impact on the price of
stocks, and thus on the market's valuation of the corporation. Of
course, financial markets may in fact be more efficient than empirical
tests validate. The tests may be flawed and the theory may be correct.
At this point, however, such hope rests entirely on prior faith in mar-
ket efficiency.
It is worth asking whether the evidence undercuts the existence of
a correct fundamental value for the corporation. For example, do the
behaviorists undercut CAPM/ECMH as a theory of valuation? Do they
offer an alternative theory of valuation? The answer to both questions
is "no." Even in the behaviorist literature, CAPM/ECMH is the theory
against which anomalies are tested. The behaviorist claim is that mar-
kets are inefficient, but this means that stock prices are not those pre-
dicted by CAPM/ECMH.
At this point, the behaviorists do not offer an alternative theory.
While behaviorists argue that investor sentiment and behavior drive
014stock prices, they do not, and probably cannot, offer a systematic ex-
planation for security prices based on investor sentiment and behav-
ior. Many of the inefficiencies that arise eventually disappear, either
because those who act inefficiently learn that their practices are costly,
or arbitrageurs uncover the inefficiency and trade it away. In either
case, valuation effects are transitory.
Consequently, when I speak of a "correct" capitalization rate or
value of the corporation, the reference is to a value calculation consis-
tent with CAPM/ECMH. I am assuming that markets, although not
entirely efficient, are relatively efficient as defined by CAPM/ECMH.
But I am also assuming that there can be differences in estimates of
the future cash flows and appropriate market capitalization rate de-
pending on the precise model of CAPM that is adopted and on
knowledge of the appropriate risk factors. In this sense, there is no
way of knowing with certainty the appropriate valuation at any point
in time. In this setting, the next question is whether managers (or
perhaps informed bidders) have better information than the market,
where "better information" means a more reliable estimate of the fu-
ture returns on the company's stock (or, alternatively, a more precise
estimate of the market capitalization rate).
4 An excellent review on behavioral theories of finance is provided in SHILEIFER,
supra note 76, at 112-74.
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B. Do Corporate Managers Have a Better Estimate of the
Value of Their Company?
There is no doubt that firms have private information over a set of
variables that determine the value of the firm. Companies with firm-
specific assets have private estimates of asset- or project-specific cash
flows and discount rates that may not be known to the market. But
markets are also powerful instruments for estimating value and includ-
ing information known to firms. Who has the better information?
One way to answer this question is to examine the financial perform-
ance of corporations when they are issuing new equity.
One of the most prominent anomalies is the finding that corpora-
tions seem to be able to time the issuance of new stock, either in the
form of an initial public offering (IPO) or as a seasoned equity offer-
ing (SEO), when the future returns on such investments are abnor-
mally low." In other words, companies appear to time the market, is-
suing stock when the company's stock price is at a peak or high
plateau, so that future price appreciation is below average (based on
CAPM expected returns).
On one level it is not too surprising that corporate executives may
have inside information. More surprising is that the market does not
immediately adjust to incorporate such information. If the an-
nouncement of a new offering is made when the market is closed, the
stock price should open much lower so that the effective offering
price equals the pro rata value of the corporation. Thereafter, the
stock price of the IPO or SEO firm should perform as predicted by
CAPM. In fact, "[t]he average annual return during the five years af-
ter issuing is only 5 percent for firms conducting IPOs, and only 7
percent for firms conducting SEOs."'' : The predicted return for com-
parable, but nonissuing firms, would have produced a compound re-
turn of twelve percent per year for IPOs and fifteen percent for
SEOs. 7 In more recent work, there is evidence that managers not
only time stock issuance, but also are successful in timing adjustments
in their overall capital structure. Specifically, "firms issue relatively
95 See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50J. FIN. 23, 23 (1995)
("[C]ompanies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offering
(IPO) or seasoned equity offer (SEO), significantly underperform relative to nonissu-
ing firms .... ); Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46J.
FIN. 3, 3 (1991) (contending that "in the long-run, initial public offerings appear to be
overpriced").
Loughran & Ritter, supra note 95, at 23.
I. at 46.
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more equity than debt just before periods of low [stock] market re-
turns."9 8
The assumption of the shareholder-choice model is that markets
respond quickly to material corporate information. 99 This is contra-
dicted by the stock issuance data. In issuing new stock, the corpora-
tion is signaling that the stock is overvalued. Although the company
does not state this fact explicitly, an efficient market with informed
traders would decipher the signal using past data on the returns of is-
suing companies and correctly interpret it to mean that the stock is
overvalued. However, the market appears largely to ignore this in-
formation, adjusting only slightly to the announcement of a new stock
issue.
This example does not relate directly to information involving
valuations at the time of hostile tender offers. The evidence that in-
formed traders ignore public information issued by corporations at
the time of stock issuance is striking.'00 Unlike the takeover setting,
where there are disputed claims, here only one side is issuing the in-
formation. If financial markets ignore company information when
there is no conflicting information, it is very likely that they will ignore
information when there is conflicting information.
C. Implications for Corporate Law
So where does this leave us? We have two general results. The
first is that, in the presence of anomalies, stock prices may either pro-
vide an imprecise or an incorrect estimate of the pro rata value of the
corporation. The implication is that informed parties can have very
different estimates of the value of the company, and this is so even
when they agree as to the expected future free cash flow to be gener-
ated by the company's assets. The second is that corporate insiders, at
least some of the time, are more knowledgeable about the value of
their own companies than the market is.
What are the implications for the appropriate legal standards in-
volving takeover defenses when financial markets are only relatively
efficient? In the presence of anomalies, stock prices can either be
higher or lower than the pro rata value of the corporation. Conse-
98 Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate
Stock Returns, 55J. FIN. 2219, 2219 (2000).
99 GILSON, supra note 6, at 15-16.
100 This point is an implication of the results found by Baker & Wurgler, supra
note 98.
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quently, merger opportunities arise that may be nothing more than
profitable arbitrage trades on temporarily incorrect prices. The com-
pany whose stock is too high can become a bidder, using its inflated
currency to buy companies whose stock is not inflated. The company
whose stock is too low can become a target. 1
For informed traders to succeed in profiting from these transitory
trading opportunities and to buy a controlling interest in a corpora-
tion, they must have better information than the market, although
perhaps not as accurate as the company's own information. A varia-
tion of this reasonable assumption is present in the shareholder-
choice model as well. The difference between the two assumptions
lies in the private information learned by the bidders: in the share-
holder-choice model, the bidder learns which lousy managers hold
good assets, while in the management-discretion model, the bidder
determines that the existing stock price is too low, representing a pric-
ing anomaly.
From an efficiency perspective, standards for reviewing takeover
defenses can be evaluated against three metrics: (1) whether they
move assets to their most valued use; (2) whether they adequately
compensate shareholders; and (3). whether they create incentives for
managers to maximize the value of the corporation on behalf of
shareholders.
The Delaware standard gives management considerable discretion
to veto a hostile tender offer. Faced with a veto, the hostile bidder
who is not dissuaded has two primary options: take the case directly to
the shareholders through a proxy battle, or increase the size of the bid
in the hope of buying management's agreement. Hostile mergers can
still occur, but the effect of the standard of review is to raise the pre-
mium that the bidder will eventually need to pay."' Large premiums
are consistent with financial markets that are only relatively efficient.
101 Whereas stock is the likely consideration when inflated bidder stock creates the
takeover opportunity, cash is the likely consideration when deflated target stock is the
culprit. Cash deals were prevalent in the hostile tender offers of the late 1980s, the last
time a permissive takeover rule was in effect and dividend/price ratios were high. A
number of the hostile bidders of the 1980s would fit this picture, including the hostile
bidders in Unocal and Revlon. Similarly, stock was the consideration in many of the
mergers in the high technology and Internet sectors of the recent past when divi-
dend/price ratios were at all time lows, including the recent America Online-Time
Warner merger. See Gretchen Morgenson, AOL Time Warner May Inflate Internet'Stock
Values Even More, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at C16 (discussing the background of the
merger).
02 LIPTON & ROWE, supra note 6, at 27-28.
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Where anomalies are present, mergers could move assets to less valu-
able uses. The larger the premium required in otherwise hostile
mergers, the less likely this outcome.
Although the current policy toward takeover defenses solves the
underbidding problems, it creates significant problems as well. First,
management might veto mergers that offer a true premium in order
to retain their jobs. Second, even if the tender offer gives sharehold-
ers less than full value, shareholders might still be financially better off
if they can accept the premium bid and then reinvest the money else-
where. As long as markets are relatively efficient, the stock price
should eventually return to reflect the value of the assets. But this may
occur too slowly-the present discounted value of the full-priced firm
in the future may be less than the present value of a premium bid that
offers less than full value. 0 3 At issue is whether an underpriced stock
will outperform the market in the near future. There is some evi-
dence for this type of mean reversion in financial markets,0 4 but the
evidence is decidedly mixed. The lack of stronger evidence for mean
reversion supports the claim that shareholders do better by taking a
premium bid immediately rather than waiting for the market to cor-
rect itself. Consequently, on the first two criteria-allowing mergers
that move assets to their most valued use and compensating share-
holders-the management-discretion model has major weaknesses.
A shareholder-choice standard, which gives management little
leeway to say "no" to a noncoercive hostile bid, also generates mixed
results on the three criteria. The strongest argument in favor of
shareholder choice is that it allows shareholders to tender their stock,
take whatever premium is offered, and reinvest their money else-
where. This argument is weakened if financial markets are only rela-
tively efficient, but it is not eliminated without empirical evidence that
103 This conclusion would not be true if stock prices showed sufficiently strong
mean reversion tendencies. If underpriced stocks strongly outperform overpriced
stocks, then shareholders might be wealthier if they stay with the underpriced stock
rather than taking a bid and reinvesting it in a portfolio of stocks that includes both
underriced and overpriced stocks.
1o See, e.g., .James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, Mean Reversion in Stock
Prices: Evidence and Implications, 22J. FIN. ECON. 27, 27-59 (1988) (analyzing data from
1871-1985 in order to present statistical evidence on mean reversion); RobertJ. Shiller
& Pierre Perron, Testing the Random Walk Hypothesis: Power Versus Frequency of Observa-
tion, 18 ECON. LErERs 381-86 (1985) (tabulating power functions while holding the
span of data fixed and while varying the number of observations, and concluding that
it is more useful to think of power of a t-test or normalized beta test as depending on
the span of data rather than on the number of observations).
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undervalued firms strongly outperform the market in the near term
absent a takeover.
If financial markets are only relatively efficient, assets can be
moved to less valuable uses, allowing hostile mergers to occur at prices
below the value of the corporation. As discussed earlier,"'5 these re-
sults might be mitigated if one added an active auction process, par-
ticularly if management were also interested and able to bid. Such re-
suits, however, are not assured. In some cases, particularly where the
bidder is a dominant firm in a market, other bidders might not
emerge. Where other bidders do emerge, there is no reason to as-
sume that pricing anomalies are resolved. In a stock deal, the winning
bidder may simply have the most overvalued stock. Examples include
the stock deals that formed the conglomerates during the 1960s and
the dot-coin deals of the 1990s. In a cash deal, the winning bidder
might still pay less than true market value. For example, during the
1980s, most deals involved cash at a time when stocks sold at very low
valuations based on future free cash flow or dividends. The premiums
paid during that period still allowed the buyer to reap considerable
multiple expansions on free cash flow and dividends when multiples
expanded throughout the 1990s.10 6 Warren Buffett's claim in 1985
that even the best-managed companies sold in the market for prices
below a negotiated deal price is consistent with the multiple expan-
sion that occurred thereafter.'°7
The final issue, and the most important, deals with the incentives
created by the legal standard. Perhaps the strongest argument in fa-
vor of shareholder choice in a world of efficient markets is that it
sends a clear message to entrenched managers: run the company to
maximize shareholder value or risk losing your job to a hostile bid.
Bad managers with good assets get taken over.
If markets are only relatively efficient, however, good managers
with good assets could also lose their jobs if their stock price is caught
up in an underpricing anomaly. The signal-manage better or else-
gets replaced by a new signal-avoid, if possible, having your company
stock caught up in an anomaly. If managers believe that their stock is
subject to periods of underpricing, they might take steps to avoid be-
ing subject to the effects of the anomalies that create the low price.
105 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (asserting that an opportunity for
managers to bid in an active auction will support market efficiency).
107 Campbell & Cochrane, supra note 86.
Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, supra note 92, at
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A shareholder-choice position is structured to prevent managers
from entrenching themselves once a takeover bid has been made. In
doing so, however, it may create incentives for managers to entrench
themselves by managing to anomalies, thereby avoiding becoming the
target of a hostile bid. Different types of anomalies would lead to dif-
ferent avoidance strategies. A more detailed analysis of the actual me-
chanics is beyond the scope of this Article; however, space permits
several comments. 1°8
If the anomaly leads to the underpricing of a particular asset or
class of assets owned by the firm, the firm might sell those assets even
if the sale price were below management's estimate of the true value
of the asset. Managers might avoid investments in firm-specific, long-
lived assets for which the discount rate is dependent on firm product
market data that is not verifiable by financial markets. Although the
investment would increase the value of the corporation, it would make
the firm more vulnerable to market mispricing and hostile tender of-
fers. Finally, managers might adopt strategies so that their company's
stock becomes overpriced, for example, playing to market fads.
Adopting strategies that lead the company stock to be overvalued is
the ultimate takeover defense; moreover, the inflated currency can
turn the potential target into a bidder.
Should companies take such actions? Those who believe that fi-
nancial markets are always efficient contend that management should
manage to the stock market signals. Since there are no anomalies, all
signals are accurate. But, if markets are only relatively efficient and
managers believe, based on their own information, that the above de-
cisions reduce the ultimate value of the corporation, then the man-
ager as faithful fiduciary would not make such investment decisions.
CONCLUSION
Any legal standard governing hostile tender offers is going to have
to balance the tradeoff between allowing the shareholders to decide
the outcome of contested control transactions and having managers
decide what is best for the firm. Where incentive effects play a critical
role, this tradeoff translates into balancing the risks of bad managers
entrenching themselves by rejecting value-enhancing tender offers
versus good managers maximizing the value of the assets. A legal
108 The approach to corporate governance in this Article is highly consistent with
that of FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 79-125
(2000).
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standard involving takeover defenses, such as the one embodied in
the shareholder-choice position, views the threat of bad managers en-
trenching themselves as the primary problem that needs to be solved.
A takeover policy that gives management discretion to veto a hostile
tender offer tilts toward giving good managers the discretion to
maximize shareholder value.
In a world of perfectly efficient capital markets, a shareholder-
choice standard would be the dominant policy solution. In such a
state, any noncoercive hostile tender offer at a premium to the market
price moves assets to more valued uses while offering shareholders
enhanced market value. Best of all, it sends a clear signal to all man-
agers to be more faithful or risk losing theirjobs.
In a world where capital markets are only relatively efficient, the
calculus may shift. Successful hostile tender offers could move assets
to less valued uses. It could encourage managers to manage to the
anomalies; that is, to adopt otherwise suboptimal business strategies
intended to minimize the risks of underpricing. In this Article, I have
developed one case where this could occur. The prevailing legal
standard in Delaware regarding takeover defenses can be understood
as focused on giving managers the discretion to maximize the value of
their corporation. In light of modem finance theory, this is a plausi-
ble way to strike a balance if one assumes the choice set is between
largely unconstrained shareholder choice and largely unconstrained
management discretion. It does, however, leave important'problems
unresolved. Whether a workable, truly intermediate standard of re-
view-a fact specific inquiry descriptive of, among other things, the
size of the premium and the nature of the anomaly-is available re-
mains to be determined.
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